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ABSTRACT. Medical technology assessment deals with the evaluation of novel or existing 
health care procedures. This paper addresses the interdependence between factual and nor­
mative issues, using the controversies about acceptability and desirability of reduced-size 
liver transplantations with living donors as example.
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1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Medical technology assessment (MTA) deals with the evaluation of novel 
or existing health care procedures. This definition indicates that MTA is a 
value-laden enterprise. However, it is often far from clear in precisely what 
way MTA is value-laden. To label an assessment as value-laden is often 
held as a suggestion of bad science. This is an unfortunate mistake. Longino
*
has explained how science in general can be value-laden without being bad 
science.* Indeed, Putnam has set out to explain why any fact cannot be 
but value-laden, and, vice-versa, why any value cannot be but laden with 
facts.2 If he is right, this is likely to hold for facts produced by MTA as 
well.
To illustrate the confusion about fact-value interactions in MTA, consider 
the evaluation of liver transplantation (LTx).
We know, by and large, what the prognosis was of patients with different 
types of terminal liver failure before the introduction of LTx. We also know, 
by and large, the prognosis of patients with the same types of terminal liver 
failure, who receive a liver transplant (actual, or actuarial). Hence, we can 
assess the difference, and ascribe this difference to the introduction of LTx. 
No values involved so far, at least, so it seems. Of course, there are several 
sources of uncertainty. The number of observations may be low, which 
renders the data unreliable. Also, for some unknown reason, the prognosis
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about the feasibility of RLTx with living donors that is currently avail­
able.
3. D I R E C T  A N D  IN D I R E C T  E V I D E N C E  OF F E A S I B I L I T Y  OF
R L T x  W IT H  L IV IN G  D O N O R S
A literature search in Medline (search strategy: “liver transplantation”, 
combined with either “living donors”, “live donors”, “live related donors” 
or “ living related donors” (title, MJ, MN, MW and AB) over the years 
1990-February 1993, yielded reports on RLTx with living donors from 7 
different hospitals. The data are summarized in Table I. The data concern 
51 patients who received a partial liver transplant from a living donor. In 
most cases, the recipient was a pediatric patient. The most common indi­
cation was biliary atresia. The most common complications consisted of 
episodes of rejection of the graft, primary non-function, infections, and 
vascular-, biliary- and renal complications. The overall picture seems to 
be that RLTx Id can be performed with little intra- and post-operative risk 
to the donor. The reports differ, however, with respect to the details that 
are presented in this respect. In one paper it is simply stated that no serious 
complications were observed, without further specification.7 In the absence 
of generally agreed standards of what constitute “serious complications”, 
such information is inadequate. The papers also provide data on the effects 
of the procedure to the donors (partial resection of the liver). In this respect, 
the results are more variable. As can be expected, early experiences were 
generally poorer than later experiences. Moreover, the Turkish results 
compare poorly to the other results. In all cases, however, the follow-up 
period was short.
3.1. Indirect Evidence
The reason to believe that RLTx Id can be expected to be sufficiently effec­
tive and safe also rests on indirect evidence: Results of RLTx with cadaver 
livers (i), results of partial hepatectomy for medical indications (ii), and 
animal experimentation studies (iii).
3.1,1. Efficacy and safety of RLTx using post-mortal donor livers. Data 
on efficacy and safety of RLTx are reported by several groups. Emond 
et al. have shown that RLTx can be carried out in a way that is equally 
efficacious and safe to the recipient as OLTx, in pediatric patients with 
extrahepatic biliary atresia (EHBA), familial cholestasis and certain meta-
TABLE I
Direct evidence on outcome o f  RTLx id
Location: Sao Paulo Brisbane Izumo Chicago Ankara Matsumoto Kyoto
Brazil Australia Japan US Turkey Japan Japan
Period: 8.XII.88/21.VII.89 VII.89 13.XI.89 XI.89-II.91 IV.90-IV.92 V1.90-VII.91 VI.90-VII.91
Number of  
RLTx Id:
2 1 J 20 12 5 20
Characteristics 4 1/2 yrs 17 months 11 months 15 1/2 ± 1 1  1/2 10 months-53 yrs 
CBA (1), Byler’s 
disease (2),
cirrhosis (7) and 
hepatitis (2)
9 months- 8 months-
of the recipients 
(age, primary,
diagnosis):
(CBA) 19 months 
(fibrosis and 
CarolPs disease
(CBA) (CBA) months (M ± SD) 
CBA (16), 
alpha-1-antitrypsin 
deficiency (2), 
cytomegalovirus 
hepatitis (1) and 
giant cell hepatitis (1)
12 yrs CBA (4), 
cirrhosis and 
hepatocellular 
carcinoma (1)
15 yrs CBA (14) 
cirrhosis (2), 
Budd-Chiari (2), 
progressive 
intrahepatic 
cholestatis (1) 
protoporphyria ( 1 )
Characteristics 
of the donors:
parent 
(age 23) 
volunteer 
(age 40)
parent parent 
(26 yrs)
parents (20), 
uncle (1), 
grand mother (1) 
age 21-41 yrs
parent (7) 
spous (3) 
sibling (2) 
age 20-57 yrs
parents parents 
(24-43 yrs)
Outcome 1: death on alive, I death on survival: 17 out of survival: 4 survival: 4 survival: 17 out of
recipient: p.o. day 6 
1: alive,
] hospitalized, 
one rejection 
period
rejection period, 
discharge from 
hospital on 
3.0. day 40. 
Nearly normal 
liver function
p.o. day 
285
20; complications: 
retransplantation 
(4), rejection 
episodes (8), 
biliary (7), 
vascular (9)
out of 12 out of 5,
1 still
hospitalized. 
Infections 
in all 5 cases
18*. Complications: 
episodes of ejection 
(2), infections (2), 
renal (7), vascular 
(14), tremor (8), 
itching (4),
insomnia (2),
vomiting (1)
Follow-up
period:
1 month 5 months 9 1/2
months
3-18 months maximally 3 
months
4-17 months 1-13 months
Reference a b c d, e f g h, i, j, k
Abbreviations: CBA -  Congenital Biliary Atresia
* two patients with heart — and renal failure, respectively, were excluded from the study.
In none of the reports serious intra- or post-operative complications to the donor were observed. Discharge from the hospital occurred usually within 2 or 3 
weeks. In most of the cases they were reported to be able to resume their normal activities after a few weeks. References: a: Raia et al. (1989); b: Strong et
al. (1990); c: Nagasue et al. (1992); d: Broelsch et al. (1991), Broelsch, Stevens, Whitington (1991); f: Haberal et al. (1992); g: Kawarasaki et al (1992); h,
i, j, k: Yamaoka et al. (1991), Morimoto et al. (1992), Uemoto et al. (1991), Ozawa et al. (1992).
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bolic liver disease.8 The authors conclude that RLTx may considerably con­
tribute to reduction of pre-transplant mortality in children awaiting LTx. 
An earlier report by the same group shows that long-term survival (up to 
48 months) following RLTx is possible in pediatric patients with biliary 
atresia and fulminant hepatitis.9 Otte et a l  report of their experience with 
LTx in 117 children, 83 of which underwent OLTx and 54 of which under­
went RLTx.10 The majority (73) of the children was between 0 and 3 years 
of age and were treated for cholestatic diseases (primarily EHBA). One 
year actuarial survival rate after OLTx or RLTx was not significantly dif­
ferent. Pre-transplant mortality during these years was relatively low 
(approximately 14%). The authors conclude that RLTx is equally safe and 
effective as OLTx. The paper, reporting for the first time long-term survival 
(25 months) following RLTx, dates from 1984.11
3.L2. Safety o f  partial hepatectomy. Partial hepatectomy has been carried 
out as treatment of various benign and malignant liver diseases. As a 
consequence, mortality and morbidity associated with this procedure are 
relatively well documented. A paper by Nagao et aL for instance reports 
on partial hepatectomy in patients with hepatolithiasis (;n « 13), with on 
operative -  or hospital mortality.12 Including unpublished observations of 
their own institute, Singer et aL conclude that the operative mortality rate 
following partial hepatectomy is less than 1 % P
3.1.3. Data fi'om animal experimentation studies. Finally, the feasibility of 
partial hepatic resection and transplantation of reduced-size livers has been 
established in dogs.14
4. R L T x  W IT H  L IV IN G  D O N O R S :
J U S T I F I C A T I O N  OF ITS F U R T H E R  D E V E L O P M E N T
Singer and his colleagues have argued that it is ethically justified to 
continue the development of this innovative therapy.15 Their arguments can 
be summarized as follows:
♦ RLTx with living donors has been demonstrated to be technically 
feasible, and can be expected to be sufficiently effective and safe. For 
the recipient: with post-mortal livers, RLTx has been demonstrated to 
be equally effective as orthotopic liver transplantation (OLTx) and 
to impose no additional risk. For the donor: Partial hepatectomy can 
be performed with low peri-operative and long-term morbidity and 
mortality.
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• Organ and tissue donation by living persons is accepted in similar 
contexts (e.g. renal, pancreatic and bone-marrow transplantation).
• RLTx using living donors is in the interest of all those that are directly 
involved: the physician, motivated by a desire to save lives; the 
recipient, motivated by a desire to live; the donor, motivated by a 
desire to contribute to the saving of a life of -  in most cases -  a close 
relative.
• In a progressive society, there is an ethical imperative to pursue new 
knowledge that may benefit the people.
A major conclusion of Singer et al. reads as follows: “Given the scarcity 
of donor livers, the capability to perform OLTx using living donors, the 
potential benefits of this procedure, the motivations of the participants, and 
the acceptance of living donation in other contexts, we believe that it is 
ethically appropriate to introduce this innovative procedure.”
5. CHALLENGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF RLTx LD
In the following, I will summarize some counter-arguments, challenging 
the plausibility of (i) statements about the safety of hemihepatectomy and 
the acceptability of living donation in similar contexts, (ii) statements about 
the superiority of living donation over the use of post-mortal donor livers, 
(iii) statements about the scarcity of post-mortal donor livers and the rate 
of pre-transplant mortality, (iv) assumptions about the effectiveness of alter­
native modes of organ procurement, (v) assumptions about the feasibility 
of alternative modes of treatment and prevent of ESLD, and (vi) statements 
about the possibility of obtaining a truly informed consent from a parent- 
donor.
5.1. Safety o f  Hemihepatectomy
Busutill estimates that in the case of liver donation, the risk of mortality 
to the donor is at least 1-2%.16 This estimate is partly based on data on 
the risk of kidney-donation. According to Busutill, the available evidence 
already indicates that partial hepatectomy is likely to cause complications 
in the donor. Moreover, it is misleading to suggest that living donation in 
the context of other transplant programmes is uncontroversial. In the context 
of renal transplantation, for instance, the appropriateness of living donation 
is challenged.17 Busutill cites a review of 8200 kidney donors; 1 out of 1600 
donors died, and 2% suffered major complications (sepsis, renal failure, 
hepatitis, pneumonia).18 He concludes that “An absolutely essential pre­
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requisite for consideration of living-related transplantation is that the donor 
hemihepatectomy can be performed with a zero mortality rate, and essen­
tially no morbidity.” According to Busutill, the available evidence about 
RLTx Id indicates that these conditions are not met,
5.2. Is RLTx With Living Donors Likely to be More Beneficial Than 
RLTx With Post-mortal Livers?
RLTx with living donors may have a higher probability of success than 
RLTx with post-mortal livers, because there is more opportunity for care­
fully planning the transplantation and the quality of the liver segments is 
better (less damage due to ischaemia).19 On the basis of these data, one 
can expect that living donation has a favourable effect on transplant 
outcome.
Another reason why RLTx with living donors is thought to be more 
effective than RLTx with post-mortal livers is related to the fact that in 
the majority of cases a familial relationship will exist between donor and 
recipient. As a result of such relationship, there is an increased probability 
of immunological matching between donor and recipient. Such histocom­
patibility is likely to improve transplant outcome by reducing the proba­
bility of rejection. This argument is, however, controversial. An inverse 
relationship has actually been established between antigen matching and 
transplant outcome.20 A possible explanation for this unexpected finding 
may be that in a relatively large number of cases of LTx, the cause of the 
recipient’s liver dysfunction is immunological. In these cases, antigen com­
patibility has a dualistic effect: it reduces transplant rejection, but it also 
renders the transplant more susceptible to the immunological mechanisms 
which are responsible for the dysfunction of the recipient’s liver.21
Among liver diseases with a possibly immunological origin are primary 
biliary cirrhosis, sclerosing cholangitis, autoimmune chronic active hepatitis 
and viral hepatitis.22 In these cases, recurrence of liver failure may result 
from the persistence of disease-associated immunological mechanisms after 
transplantation. This would imply that from this point of view, donors that 
do not have a familial relationship with the recipient are preferred over 
donors that do have a familial relationship, at least in certain cases of RLTx 
using living donors.
5.3. Are Post-mortal Donor Livers Scarce?
How many deaths among infants with ESLD can be prevented by the 
utilization of living donors? According to proponents of living donation,
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approximately 50% of infants with ESLD dies while waiting for a trans­
plant. This figure is disputed by Busutill.23 His estimate of the need for 
transplants among infants in the U.S., based on data on the incidence of 
ESLD, is 249 per year. His estimate of the supply of cadaver livers for 
this group of patients, based on Donor Demographic Data of the United 
Network for Organ Sharing, is 257 per year. Included in this figure is one 
quarter of reduced-size livers from adolescents. Hence, no scarcity and 
considerably lower pre-transplant mortality among infants with ESLD. The 
latter is estimated between 15 and 25%. In addition, Busutill maintains that 
improved techniques for preserving cadaver livers allows utilization at a 
higher rate of these livers.
Similarly, Emond et a l  maintain that using larger donors for small recip­
ients does not place larger recipients at a greater risk of not receiving a 
transplant: Review of patterns of donor utilization suggests that there is a 
relative abundance of full-size grafts.24 In 1987, there were approximately 
3,500 cadaver donors whereas 1,199 liver transplants were performed in 
the U.S. in that year. According to these authors, the major problem is not 
scarcity of post-mortal donor livers per se . Rather, it is the disparity 
between the epidemiology of liver disease in children and the occurrence 
of brain death and organ donation in this age group. This problem can be 
largely overcome by using RLTx, and there is no need to include living 
donors. Otte et al. also note that the supply of donor livers exceeds the 
demand, stressing that the major problem is size disparity.25 This is con­
sistent with data from Eurotransplant.26 In a report by the Dutch Health 
Council, the conclusion was reached that at present there is no scarcity of 
post-mortal donor livers in the Netherlands either.27
The question of scarcity of cadaver livers is closely related to the 
question of the feasibility to increase the supply of these cadaver livers or 
decrease the demand for them. To the former, assumptions about effec­
tiveness of organ procurement arrangements are relevant. To the latter, 
assumptions about alternative modes of treatment or prevention of ESLD 
are of importance. Both issues will be taken up below.
5.4. Effectiveness o f Alternative Organ-procurement Arrangements
Can a future increase in demand be matched by changes in legislation 
on organ procurement, or by increasing public awareness? The groups 
of Michielsen and of Gnant have argued that the availability of donor 
organs in Belgium is relatively high, as a result of the “presumed consent1’ 
system that has been implemented.28 This conclusion was challenged by 
Jakobson and by Land and Cohen.29 The controversy is unresolved at
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present; some authors conclude that the picture is complicated since 
multiple factors determine donor organ availability,30 or because there are 
direct as well as more subtle, indirect effects of organ procurement 
methods.31
5.5. Feasibility o f Alternative Modes o f  Treatment and of Prevention of 
ESLD
Can the need for LTx be decreased by alternative modes of treatment or 
primary prevention of liver failures, ultimately leading to ESLD? Is it rea­
sonable to expect break-throughs that will lead to a significant reduction 
in the demand for transplants? Currently, a number of developments take 
place that suggest that this may indeed be the case. The following devel­
opments warrant mentioning:
Treatment o f  primary biliary cirrhosis with ursodiol?2 A two-year, 
multicenter, double blind trial to compare the efficacy of ursodiol with 
that of placebo showed that ursodiol is a safe and effective treatment of 
primary biliary cirrhosis, which is a major indication among adults for LTx. 
Therapeutic interventions in the case of liver failure, other than solid-organ 
transplantation, include liver cell transplantation, enzyme substitution 
therapies, Kasai’s procedure, and dietary prescriptions. Among preventive 
measures are the prevention of viral infections (hepatitis), and the pre­
vention of alcohol abuse.
5.6. Can a Truly Free and Informed Consent be Obtained From the 
Donor?
Doubt persists with respect to the feasibility of obtaining a true informed 
consent from the donor, if the donor is the parent and hemihepatectomy is 
the only way to save the life of their child. This in spite of the special pro­
cedures that were proposed by Singer et a l 33 The point is raised by Busutill: 
. . how can a parent be expected to make an informed, uncoerced, free 
choice when asked to consider donating an organ to his or her dying 
child?”34
Bio-ethicist Caplan also argued that it can never be a matter of free 
choice to the parents, whether or not to provide liver segments for their 
own.35
The doubt, whether in this context people can really freely decide 
whether to donate or not, is discussed by Fox and Swazey.36 They extend 
it to the obligation felt by the recipient to accept a donor organ. They 
discuss why, in spite of these felt obligations, reservations with respect
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to the transplantation may persist on both parts. They also discuss the social 
strains that are produced if people fail to live up to these obligations.
Fox and Swazey apply the “gift-exchange paradigm,” described by 
Mauss to the exchange of organs for transplantation.37 This paradigm entails 
that “to offer and give, to receive and accept, and to seek and find an appro­
priate way to repay” are the entwined obligations constitutive of any gift- 
relationship.
According to Fox and Swazey, the application of this gift-exchange 
paradigm to organ transplantation “illuminates many of the distinctive 
psychological and social phenomena that donors, recipients, their families, 
and the transplant team mutually encounter.” Fox and Swazey express the 
obligations on the part of the donor as follows: . . even though the 
American organ donation system has been organized around the cardinal 
societal principles of voluntarism and freedom of choice, in the type of 
situations where transplants are performed, prospective donors and their 
families are subject to strong inner and outer pressures to make such a 
gift."
As we saw above, similar doubts were expressed by Busutill and Caplan, 
Fox and Swazey put these in wider framework, involving recipients as well. 
The obligation to accept an organ and to seek and find an appropriate way 
to repay are expressed as follows: “Whatever the potential recipient’s reser­
vations may be about a transplant, great reluctance or outright refusal to 
accept the life-saving gift that is offered symbolically implies a rejection 
of the donor and of the donor’s relationship to the recipient.”
With respect to the role of the surgeons, Fox and Swazey state that there 
is uneasiness among them “about the fact that transplanting an organ from 
a living donor requires them to aggressively violate the basic moral tenet 
of their profession to do no harm by seriously wounding an individual 
who is neither sick or a conventional patient -  albeit on behalf of someone 
who is mortally ill and has sought their help.”
By the way of conclusion Fox and Swazey state that “The giving and 
receiving of a gift of enormous value is . . . the most significant meaning 
of human organ transplantation.”
6. A N A L Y S I S  OF TH E C O N T R O V E R S IE S :
F A C T U A L  IN F O R M A T I O N  A N D  N O R M A T IV E  J U D G M E N T
What are we to make of the aforementioned controversies? It is surprising 
that a number of seemingly empirical questions are resistant to closure. 
This holds for pre-transplantation mortality and organ scarcity, impact of
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organ procurement legislation on organ availability, as well as for the risks 
and benefits of RLTx with living donors to the donor and the recipient. Part 
of the explanation is that a number of normative standards are involved; 
difference of opinion may exist with respect to the adequacy and relative 
weight of such standards.
On the basis of the account given so far, two extreme positions with 
respect to the different issues related to RLTx Id can be distinguished. The 
first position (A) can be characterized as follows: It is held that there is 
considerable discrepancy between demand and supply of livers for trans­
plantation. Such a discrepancy results in a high pre-transplant mortality 
rate: a considerable number of patients with ESLD who are waiting for a 
transplant die before a suitable transplant is found. Moreover, such scarcity 
of transplants necessitates strict selection between candidates: who should 
get the transplant if not all can have one? All measures that could mitigate 
this situation are considered to be largely exhausted. Hence, mortality 
among ESLD patients waiting for a transplant can be avoided if, and only 
if, alternative sources of transplants are used, in this case living donors.38 
It is deemed that morally there is an imperative to prevent or reduce mor­
tality and suffering as the result of ESLD. Any of this mortality or mor­
bidity that is unnecessary, in the sense that it could have been prevented, 
is considered morally unacceptable. Selection among transplant candidates, 
necessary because of scarcity of transplants, is also deemed arbitrary and 
unjust: there do not seem to be any generally acceptable criteria to select 
among patients. These considerations act to justify the search for and 
enactment of alternative modes to increase supply of organs, in this case 
through the use of living donors. Of course, the risks to the donor should 
not be too high, but the available evidence suggests that the risks are within 
acceptable limits. Similarly, it is deemed morally unacceptable if indi­
viduals would be coerced to donate; informed consent procedures are 
considered to be capable to prevent this from happening. Any doubts with 
respect to adverse effects of living donation on human relationships or on 
our view of human life, are ignored, or brushed aside as subordinate to 
the saving of human lives and the reduction of suffering associated with 
ESLD.
The other position (B) is as follows:
It is held that there is hardly any discrepancy between demand and 
supply for organs. As a result, the estimate of pre-transplant mortality is 
much lower than in (A). The difference is partly due to the fact that the 
estimate of the actual need for transplants is lower than in (A). This need 
for transplants is not given. Of course, it is to a large extent determined
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by the incidence and prevalence of ESLD. But it also depends on criteria 
of eligibility: who, among the patients with terminal liver failure, is likely 
to benefit sufficiently from a transplant?
Such criteria shift in time, and differ geographically. Patients with certain 
characteristics may have been excluded from transplantation which, after 
some time, hardly seems to be justified. A striking example of this is 
given by patients with liver cirrhosis as the result of alchohol abuse. 
Conversely, certain indications may have been included which, after 
some time, turns out to be unjustified. Examples may be hepatitis with 
active viral replication, or primary liver tumors. Criteria of eligibility are 
related (1) to standards of minimally required outcome of a transplanta­
tion program, (2) to trade-offs between benefits and burdens to the indi­
vidual patient and (3) to the society at large (employment of resources and 
their opportunity costs). A lower estimate of the need for transplants may 
also result from higher expectations with respect to effective prevention 
or alternative mode of treatment of ESLD. The low estimate of transplant 
scarcity is partly due to higher estimates of the actual supply and utiliza­
tion rate of transplants. This supply of organs is not given either, and 
depends on criteria of post-mortal donor eligibility. Is it, for instance, 
justified to include “marginal donors” (post-mortal organ donors fifty years 
of age or more)? Age and health status of the donor may adversely affect 
transplant outcome, but the issue seems to be unresolved at present. There 
is also the question whether organ procurement arrangements affect the 
availability of post-mortal organs. Estimates of the rate of utilization of 
transplants depend on assumptions concerning the impact of organ preser­
vation techniques, immunosuppression, organizational aspects, etc.
According to this position, the estimate of pre-transplant mortality is 
low, and the selection of patients for transplantation appears to be settled. 
Hence, there is no justification of using living donors as organ suppliers. 
The actual risk to the donor may be estimated higher than in (A), and is 
at any rate not acceptable: the use of living donors does not result in a 
significant decrease of pre-transplant mortality. These judgments may at 
least partly be prompted by considerations related to the “gift-exchange 
paradigm”: the obligations and the reservations with respect to offering and 
accepting an organ, and the social strains that ensue from these. Often, 
however, such considerations are left implicit.
The foregoing illustrates how moral judgment about acceptability and 
desirability of RLTx Id depends on factual information and how this factual 
information in turn involves several normative judgments. To name a few 
of such normative judgments:
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• How safe and effective should RLTx Id be, and how safe and effec­
tive is it? There is disagreement about both of these issues. The two 
questions are indeterminate as long it is unspecified what is under­
stood by “effective” and by “safe” and what is considered acceptable 
evidence to establish this (for instance statistical power and prospec­
tive nature of studies).
• What is the appropriate outcome measure: should safety be ex­
pressed by the mortality rate, by morbidity and complications, or by 
quality of life? Should the social strains associated to the “gift- 
exchange relationship be taken into account, and if so, what is 
their relative weight? Such questions can only be answered if the 
context in which they arise is taken into account. An operative 
mortality rate of 1 % may be quite acceptable in one context, but not 
in another.
• What is the appropriate time horizon: Should we follow donors after 
hemihepatectomy for 6 months, 1 year, 5 years? Here, judgment is 
likely to be related to an estimate of the probability of adverse effects 
of hemihepatectomy in the long run: Is there any reason to believe 
that such long-term effects could occur, and what sort of effects 
should we look for? The same holds for the follow-up of the recipi­
ents: Is there any reason to expect complications from RLTx Id in 
the longer run (say 5 or 10 years)? And if so, does that affect our 
judgment about acceptability and desirability of RLTx Id? There is 
uncertainty about the question how reduced-size livers implanted in 
very young children grow and develop along with the developing 
child, uncertainty about adverse effects of the use of immunosup- 
pressiva on the development of very young children, and uncertainty 
about full recovery of the liver function of the donor. But is it not 
decisive that, at this moment, the lives of young children can be 
rescued?
• The supply of grafts nor the demand for them is given; they depend 
on criteria of eligibility of donors and recipients. These, in turn, 
depend on requirements concerning the minimally required outcome 
of the procedure, in view of burdens to patients and their relatives, 
burdens to rejected patients, its opportunity costs, etc. An estimate 
of scarcity of grafts also depends on judgment about alternative modes 
to increase supply of grafts or decrease the demand for them. Here, 
methodological criteria are involved, determining the acceptability of 
evidence.
• In each of these cases, the question turns up: What level of certainty 
is necessary, in order to make accountable decisions?
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The nature of the normative standards that are implicated in the empirical 
evidence concerning RLTx Id is partly cognitive and partly moral. In the 
two following sections I will further elaborate the involvement of cogni­
tive and moral values, respectively.
7. CREDIBILITY: THE CRITERION OF COHERENCE
In order to be taken into account, facts about RLTx Id have of course “to 
make sense.” The findings of Markus et al,39 are puzzling in view of our 
knowledge about histocompatibility and probability of immunological 
rejection of the transplant. The authors try to provide a satisfactory expla­
nation for the observed phenomena. As long as they do not succeed in 
this, their data are likely to be considered as anomalies: findings that cannot 
be explained within the framework of accepted medical knowledge. As 
such, they are likely to be dismissed as irrelevant. What, then, is a satis­
factory explanation of these results? Here, the methodological criterion of 
coherence is of decisive importance. By pointing to the immunological 
origin of certain terminal liver failures, Markus et a l . succeed in providing 
a satisfactory explanation for the dual effect of histocompatibility on trans­
plant outcome. This would explain the increased probability of recurrence 
of the disease after transplantation in the case of HLA-antigen matching 
between donor and recipient. If it can be convincingly established that 
immunological origins of terminal renal or heart failure are much rarer, 
the findings of Markus et al. gain credibility. This example shows how 
the relative weight that is attributed to empirical evidence depends on a 
methodological criterion. This is particularly important in view of the 
conflicting evidence: what weight should be given to studies with con­
flicting outcomes? This issue is complicated by the fact that there are 
several methodological criteria with often conflicting requirements.40 
Relatively little has been done to assess the relative weight of different 
methodological criteria in a particular context, and to resolve conflicting 
requirements.
7.1. Cognitive Values: Standards of Rational or Justified Belief
The claim that, generally, cognitive values are implied in statements about 
effectiveness and safety of RLTx Id, can be further substantiated as follows: 
The statement
“partial hepatectomy is sufficiently safe to the donor”
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is short-hand for the statement
“On the basis of the available evidence it is rational to believe that partial 
hepatectomy is sufficiently safe to the donor. ”
If it is accepted that such rephrasing does not alter the content of the state­
ment, and that rationality is a cognitively normative concept, it follows that 
the first statement about safety implies cognitive standards, bearing on the
acceptability of evidence.
Another way of arguing that statements like the one above involve cog­
nitive values is by asking: What sort of procedure would be required in 
order to settle a controversy? Any answer that is given to this question 
involves methodological standards. In the case of this type of controversy, 
it is important to make such standards explicit.
The question, which procedure should be followed in order to settle the 
issue, seems to be particularly pressing with respect to the possibility to 
obtain informed consent. How can it be proved that someone has made an 
uncoerced decision on the basis of an adequate understanding of what is 
at stake? Can such proof be hard at all? There are instances where it can 
be fairly confidently concluded that the decision to donate was not made 
freely. For instance, someone who is imprisoned and acts as a donor and 
who expects, perhaps erroneously, to be released. Or, in the case of finan­
cial rewards, someone who acts as a donor because he desperately needs 
money. It seems to be much more difficult to reach a similar level of cer­
tainty to establish that someone did consent freely, well-informed and on 
the basis of an adequate understanding. However, if, in case of doubt about 
the consent procedure, parents are not allowed to donate, this certainly 
seems to infringe on their freedom to act. Who, but the parents themselves, 
should decide whether they consent freely or not, or, for that matter, accept 
that it can never be a matter of free consent? The questions raised here are 
questions of explication of a moral concept. I will take up this subject in 
the following section.
8. M O RA L C O N C E P T S D E T E R M IN E  T H E  R E L E V A N C E  OF F A C T S
In the foregoing, I stated that judgment about the desirability and accept­
ability of RLTx Id depends on factual information. I also stated that this 
factual information itself is not value-free. In this section, I will explore 
this interdependence between normative and empirical issues further.
The following issues need further clarification:
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1. The foregoing sections suggest that the debate about RLTx Id 
revolves around a limited set of moral concepts, like beneficence, 
non-maleficence, and autonomy. Many disagreements take the form 
of “If  hemihepatectomy would be safe (consistent with the require­
ments o f  non-maleficence), then RLTx Id would be morally accept­
able.” However, there is disagreement about the question whether it 
is safe. Similarly: “If  the decision to offer a portion o f  the liver could 
be made in a non-coercive way (consistent with the requirements o f  
autonomy), then RLTx Id would be morally a c c e p t a b l e Again, 
however, there is disagreement about the question whether such a 
non-coercive decision can be made in this context. What is the exact 
nature of these disagreements? Are they about factual issues? Partly, 
yes, but these facts are themselves laden with values. Are these rival 
interpretations of moral concepts, and if so, can it be established 
which one is correct? Do the disagreements result from a different 
weighing of moral values?
2. How are certain aspects of RLTx Id recognized as relevant to our 
judgment about its moral propriety? In the following, I will discuss 
how moral concepts are brought to bear on empirical facts about 
RLTx Id, and how this, in turn, affects the content of the relevant
p
moral concept. To this end, I will present a model of moral discourse 
elaborated by Brennan,41 which, in my view, is compatible with 
Putnam’s theory of facts and values.42
8.1. The Structure o f  Moral Argument
In Brennan’s model, moral concepts play a diagnostic  role: Through 
them, neutral facts are transformed and charged with moral significance. 
Examples of moral concepts are beneficence and autonomy. If we are 
committed to the concept of beneficence, and have a particular under­
standing of what the concept entails, we are capable of identifying certain 
actions or situations as beneficent or as non-beneficent. More often than 
not, there is difference of opinion about the question whether certain 
actions are beneficent or not. In such cases, we may start by asking whether 
there is agreement on the formal content of the concept. An example of 
the formal content of the concept of beneficence is: the obligation to help 
others further their important and legitimate interests.43 And, in the case 
of autonomy: Autonomy is the capacity of individuals to reflect critically 
upon preferences, desires, wishes etc., and the capacity to accept or attempt 
to change these in light of considered value commitments. By exercising 
such a capacity, individuals define their nature, give meaning and coher-
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ence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they 
are.44
These definitions of the formal content reveal their complexity, and their 
relation to other concepts. If agreement can be reached on the formal 
content of these concepts, we proceed by asking what follows from these 
concepts in the particular context. In Brennan’s terms, this is the explica­
tion of the concept. Part of the argument of Singer et a/.45 amounts to the 
statement that RLTx with living donors is an instance of beneficence in 
the context of health care. This statement is clearly not shared by Busutill, 
or by Fox and Swazey. The question is, then, of course: which of the com­
peting explications is correct? In Brennan’s model, to address this question 
we need to identify and agree upon paradigm cases of autonomous (and 
beneficent) and non-autonomous (and non-beneficent) actions and situa­
tions. Only then we can begin to grasp the meaning of the concept. 
Subsequently, we have to determine similarities and dissimilarities between 
the present case and these paradigmatic cases, in order to arrive at a moral 
judgment about the case at hand. If agreement on the correct explication 
of a moral concept fails to materialize, we have to take recourse to its 
rationale^  The rationale should provide an answer to the question why it 
is, that we are committed to the concepts of beneficence and autonomy. 
Why should we further other people’s important and legitimate interests? 
Why should we enable them to exercise their autonomy? The rationale of 
a moral concept acts as a controlling norm on its explication. For an expli­
cation of a moral concept to be correct, it should be plausible in view of 
its rationale. Again, different reasons may be provided and such different 
rationales may yield different and conflicting explications of the concept. 
As such, there is not the prospect that a conflict can be resolved with 
certainty.
Of course, complications may arise because of possibly conflicting 
requirements between different moral concepts, but I will leave this impor­
tant point aside. Brennan’s model is a formal model: It is silent with respect 
to the question whether RLTx Id is morally right or wrong. Its value stems 
from the fact that by distinguishing between different components of moral 
concepts, and by making explicit the interdependence between moral con­
cepts and empirical facts, it helps to locate sources of disagreement. The 
practical significance consists in the determination of the appropriate way 
to proceed in trying to resolve the conflict. In addition, the model indi­
cates certain logical constraints on moral inquiry. Notably, it states that as 
the result of the open-texture of moral concepts, conflicts involving moral 
judgments can never be conclusively settled through deductive argument.
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8.2. Paradigm Cases and Open-texture: Morality's Continuity and 
Change
Brennan summarizes the properties of moral concepts by qualifying them 
as open-textured concepts. By this he means that it is not possible to state 
criteria that are necessary and sufficient for their correct application.47 
Rather, criteria for application are implied by provisionally established 
instances of the moral concept. Hence, the importance of knowledge about 
these “paradigm” cases. It is the key to improve our understanding of any 
moral concept. However, since moral concepts are open-textured, there is 
always the possibility of cases arising where their applicability is in 
doubt.
Thus, in moral inquiry, we can distinguish between a moral hypothesis 
and a moral judgment. The moral hypothesis is a statement saying that a 
particular act or situation belongs to a certain type, classified by a moral 
concept and can therefore be judged morally right or wrong. The moral 
judgment is a statement about the truth or falsity of this hypothesis. Such 
a moral judgment implies our commitment to the concept; if we are not 
committed to the relevant moral concept, we are not likely to be inter­
ested in the question whether acts or situations are morally right or wrong. 
It also implies a certain understanding of the concept: Only if we have a 
certain understanding of the concept of beneficence are we likely to be able 
to recognize acts as beneficent or non-beneficent. Moral judgment also 
implies adequate knowledge about the facts that may be relevant to our 
judgment.
Finally, if we are successful in convincing others that certain types of 
actions are beneficent, we thereby add to the meaning of the concept. That 
is: If our hypothesis is considered right, and our judgment sound, we have 
thereby established a fact which, in turn, may be used to judge other cases. 
This may, but need not, entail that the meaning of the concept is slightly 
altered. What is at stake in moral inquiry, then, is to try to achieve agree­
ment on the correct explication of moral concepts, and to get certain cases 
“established.” This process involves a fundamental, and inevitable paradox: 
To know what follows from a moral concept, we have to understand its 
meaning. To understand its meaning, however, entails knowing what 
follows from it. Moral meaning emerges, so to speak, from bringing facts 
and moral concepts to bear on each other. Differentiating between more 
and less established cases is an attempt to resolve the paradox. Sufficient 
agreement in a society is postulated on the questions, which types of actions 
or situations can be classified as paradigm cases, in order to convey the
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meaning of particular moral concepts. The open-texture of these concepts 
admits for rival interpretations and moral innovation.
8.3. The Value-ladenness o f  Facts
In the introduction I mentioned the confusion about the value-ladenness 
of medical technology assessment (MTA). In what way, exactly, are facts 
produced by MTA laden with moral values? In the foregoing I have tried 
to demonstrate that the key-answer to the question is: through relevance. 
There is an infinite number of facts about RLTx Id, none of which is 
relevant to our judgment about its moral acceptability and desirability, 
unless we are committed to and understand the meaning of certain moral 
concepts. The saving of a human life, and the reduction of psychical and 
physical suffering are so broadly supported objectives that their normative 
nature frequently goes unnoticed. It is a particular explication of moral 
concepts like beneficence and non-maleficence in the context of health care. 
The same holds for the informed consent procedure: It is a particular expli­
cation of the moral concept of autonomy in a medical context. The entire 
issue of social justice (the costs and opportunity costs of the program) is 
largely ignored. From within transplantation medicine, this main-stream 
methodology has been recently criticized by Guttmann.48 He considers the 
figures that are used to express the characteristics of transplants inadequate 
to reflect aspects of these medical procedures that are relevant to a judgment 
about their moral acceptability. Others have argued that these figures 
frequently testify of an overly optimistic view on the benefits of trans­
plantation technology.49 They state that “ the real long-term results are not 
satisfactory even in patients with initial good graft function” (a statement 
that involves several normative judgments). Moreover, they state that the 
rejected patients and the patients with only partial rehabilitation must not 
be forgotten. In children, reduced function level of a grafted kidney often 
results in retardation in development. Also, reversibility of pre-transplant 
retardation and deficiencies often appears to be limited. Fox and Swazey 
set some of these drawbacks in a wider theoretical framework, trying to 
explain why living donation causes moral perplexity. Spare Parts can be 
considered as a final attempt of the two authors to remind us that emphasis 
on graft and patient survival curves testifies of a gross underrating of the 
complexity of the moral dimensions involved in RLTx Id, indeed, of the 
complexity of our morality itself. They emphasize the impact of organ trans­
plantation and the donation and receiving of organs on human relationships 
(“the gift relationship”).
Implicitly, Fox and Swazey hold that the “gift-relationship” as described
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by Mauss is a valuable aspect of our social life. It is something that deserves 
to be actively preserved and the required efforts are worth making. On the 
other hand, proponents of RLTx Id maintain that donors are plentifully 
rewarded if, through their act of donation, the recipient recovers and 
stays alive. If social strains result from living donation, we should not 
give in to them. Rather than accepting these strains as given, we ought to 
consider such feelings as inappropriate, opening up the way for further tech­
nological innovations. In other words, a good case can be made for moral 
innovation. In Brennan’s terms, these are rival explications of moral 
concepts. In such cases we may have to raise the question of the rationale 
of moral concepts. Why is it that we should further other people’s impor­
tant and legitimate interests? Why is it that we should allow people to 
exercise their autonomy? I feel that without facing more squarely such ques­
tions of the rationale of moral concepts, there seems little hope of resolu­
tion of these controversies.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper I have tried to address the issue how facts and values are 
entwined in assessing medical technologies. I have taken the case of RLTx 
Id to illustrate the following points:
• The acceptability and desirability of this particular medical tech­
nological development is controversial. Analysis of the contro­
versies shows that methodological standards are implied, determining 
the acceptability of evidence. I tried to substantiate this point by 
arguing that statements about effectiveness, safety and feasibility of 
alternative options can be rephrased, without altering their content, 
in the following way: “On the available evidence, and in view of 
accepted knowledge, it is rational to believe that etc etc.” Different 
arguments can be used to settle the question of rationality, making 
use of various methodological procedures. This is one source of 
indeterminacy.
• The factual evidence about RLTx Id partly determines our judgment 
about its moral propriety. Examples of such factual issues are: What 
is the rate of pre-transplant mortality that can be avoided by including 
living donors? What is the risk of partial hepatectomy to the donor? 
What is the feasibility of options to raise the supply of organs? The 
fact that such data are broadly considered relevant to our judgment 
indicates adherence to the same moral values. These controversies are 
of the following form:
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-  if  post-mortal livers were scarce, and, consequently, pre-transplant 
mortality rates high, then RLTx Id would be morally acceptable. 
However, it is not clear whether there actually is such scarcity;
-  if  partial hepatectomy were safe, then it would be morally accept­
able» However, it is unclear whether the procedure actually is safe;
-  if a meaningful, truly informed consent could be obtained, then 
RLTx Id would be morally acceptable. However, it is unclear 
whether this is so or not.
This was one aspect of Putnam’s statement, viz. that moral values are laden 
with facts.
• Our commitment to and understanding of moral concepts determines 
which facts are relevant to consider, when judging about the propriety 
of a medical procedure like RLTx Id. This was the other part of 
Putnam's statement, viz. the value-ladenness of facts. I relied on 
Brennan’s model to clarify the interdependency between facts and 
moral concepts. There are no criteria that are necessary and sufficient 
for the correct explication of moral concepts. This is another source 
of indeterminacy.
• A judgment about the acceptability of risks, associated with RLTx 
with living donors, includes a judgment about the feasibility of alter­
native options. In the case of RLTx Id this includes, for instance, a 
judgment about the question whether strategies to increase post-mortal 
organ availability are effective.
• In Brennan’s terms, the controversy indicates that the use of living 
donors in transplantation is one of the developments in modern 
medicine that causes moral perplexity: we are not sure whether to 
proceed with this medical development if morally right or wrong, 
Brennan tries to provide an explanation for this phenomenon of moral 
perplexity. His explanation can be summarized as follows:
1. We are committed to certain moral concepts. This means that we 
are prepared to live in a way which is consistent with the require­
ments that in our view ensue from these moral concepts.
2. We have a certain understanding of these moral concepts. This 
means that we are capable of recognizing moral dimensions of 
empirically ascertainable acts and situations.
3. This is, of course, a highly idealized account of our commitment 
to and understanding of moral concepts: Our knowledge and under­
standing are (also in this respect) incomplete and subject to revision 
or refutation. This moral uncertainty is partly the cause of moral 
perplexity. Moral perplexity comes in yet another form: the second 
occurs in case of conflicting requirements between two or more
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moral concepts. In such cases, trade-offs need to be made between 
conflicting requirements, ensuing from different moral concepts. 
How these trade-offs are made is context-dependent. These features 
of moral inquiry explain why persistent and pervasive moral dis­
agreement is possible, in spite of adherence to the same moral 
concepts. Moral inquiry, in this view, is a social process aimed at 
consensus about the correct explication of moral concepts.
Thus, the conclusions that were reached by Singer et a l ,45 that RLTx Id 
can and should be done, may be premature. They argue that, in spite of 
the fact that the case of RLTx using living donors is as yet relatively poorly 
documented, there is sufficient ground to proceed. Of course, it is con­
ceivable that decisions, aimed at constraining the diffusion of the tech­
nology in order to obtain more data on efficacy and safety in a carefully 
controlled way, result in death of patients that might have been rescued by 
the technology. It is precisely this assertion that frequently acts to justify 
pursuance of development of a particular medical technology. If the result 
of not implementing a technology is that patients will surely die, then 
relatively low probabilities of benefit and/or relatively high probabilities 
of adverse outcome may be considered acceptable. In this way, the neces­
sity to carefully establish efficacy and safety is more or less “bypassed.” 
It is also frequently suggested that in time, with further development of 
the technology, the benefit/risk ratio will improve (cf. the development of 
LTx itself).50 It is probably because of the fact that potential benefits can 
never be ruled out, that it is extremely difficult to justify not to pursue 
developments in medical technology. This might be one of the reasons 
that development of medical technology appears to have a momentum of 
its own, and that there is very little possibility to exert control. However, 
there is a serious drawback: Some of the risks will inevitably appear to 
have been unwarranted, but only in hindsight.51
I think it is safe to say that by no matter which standards, RLTx Id should 
be qualified as an experimental procedure. Such a statement is not likely 
to stir the emotions. The statement is, however, gratuitous, unless it is 
specified what the exact implications are of such a qualification, (a) What 
implications does it have for its further documentation, eligibility, consent- 
procedure, financing, etc.?; (b) more importantly, it should be specified 
on the basis of which evidence it will be decided to continue to qualify 
RLTx Id as experimental, to qualify RLTx Id as common practice , or to 
abandon the procedure. These questions are the more pressing, in view of 
conflicting evidence and indeterminacy of methodological standards.
The current state of art seems to be that the questions are raised, but 
that no satisfactory answers are as yet provided. They can probably best
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be conceived as setting a research agenda for the next years. There are no 
generally accepted methodological criteria that are necessary and sufficient 
to validate our knowledge. Trade-offs between different criteria have to 
be made.52 This makes it difficult, if not outright impossible, to conclu­
sively settle the sort of controversies surrounding the issue of RLTx Id. It 
also means that there will always be a degree of uncertainty, of indeter­
minacy. This indeterminacy raises a number of important questions:
Who bears the burden of proof? Do we give medical technology the 
benefit of the doubt and does the burden of proof rest with the one who 
wishes to establish that it is not advisable to proceed with a particular devel­
opment in this context? Or do we stick more rigorously to “primum non 
n ocere” and does the burden of proof rest with the one who wishes to 
establish that it is, after all, desirable and acceptable to proceed with it?
Cognitive and moral uncertainties are closely related in these questions. 
Will the introduction and further development of this medical technology 
adversely affect certain aspects of human relationships that are deemed 
valuable? Will the content of certain moral concepts change if living 
donation becomes gradually more and more accepted? I hope to have shown 
that moral philosophy can, in various ways, be of use when addressing these 
questions; however, the processes that ultimately seem to settle these ques­
tions have a much broader social scope.
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